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Drafting the Great Army: The Political Economy of Conscription in Napoleonic France
The Journal of Economic History ( IF 2.459 ) Pub Date : 2023-11-01 , DOI: 10.1017/s0022050723000360
Louis Rouanet , Ennio E. Piano

Napoléon Bonaparte revolutionized the practice of war with his reliance on a mass national army and large-scale conscription. This system faced one major obstacle: draft evasion. This article discusses Napoléon’s response to widespread draft evasion. First, we show that draft dodging rates across France varied with geographic characteristics. Second, we provide evidence that the regime adopted a strategy of discriminatory conscription enforcement by setting a lower (higher) conscription rate for those regions where the enforcement of conscription was more (less) costly. Finally, we show that this strategy resulted in a rapid fall in draft dodging rates across France.



中文翻译:

组建伟大的军队:拿破仑法国征兵的政治经济学

拿破仑·波拿巴依靠大规模国民军和大规模征兵,彻底改变了战争实践。该系统面临一个主要障碍:逃避草案。本文讨论了拿破仑对广泛逃兵的反应。首先,我们表明法国各地的逃避兵役率因地理特征而异。其次,我们提供的证据表明,该政权采取了歧视性征兵执法策略,对征兵执行成本较高(较低)的地区设定较低(较高)的征兵率。最后,我们表明这一策略导致法国各地的逃避兵役率迅速下降。

更新日期:2023-11-01
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