Since Russia’s warfare against Ukraine began in 2014, there has been an increasing tendency within NATO-countries to pinpoint and bundle together internal ‘enemies’ with one external enemy: Russia. This conflation of science and politics may confront scholars with what Huysmans (2002) calls the ‘normative security dilemma of writing security’: when scholars sensitive to how ‘security talk’ can have unfortune consequences themselves become part of the threat constructions they seek to tone down. This paper asks what epistemic consequences this ‘knowledge for war’ might have and the extent to which scholars can, and should, do anything to counter these tendencies. Drawing on illustrations from discussions between Norwegian scholars in the prelude and immediate aftermath of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the paper’s point of departure is a debate on what explanations were deemed as apologetic towards Putin. The paper then moves on to discuss the epistemic politics entailed in a ‘knowledge for war’ and argues that that the tendency to look for inner enemies can contribute to precluding certain scholarly explanations. Finally, the contribution considers how scholars may re-present Russian narratives in ways that avoids reproducing the Kremlin’s war propaganda.

自2014年俄罗斯对乌克兰发动战争以来，北约国家内部越来越倾向于将内部“敌人”与一个外部敌人——俄罗斯——捆绑在一起。科学与政治的这种融合可能会让学者们面临休斯曼斯（Huysmans，2002）所说的“书写安全的规范安全困境”：当学者对“安全谈话”如何产生不幸后果敏感时，他们自己也成为了他们试图强调的威胁结构的一部分。向下。本文询问这种“战争知识”可能会产生哪些认知后果，以及学者们能够并且应该在多大程度上采取措施来对抗这些倾向。该论文借鉴了挪威学者在俄罗斯全面入侵乌克兰之前和之后的讨论中的插图，出发点是一场关于哪些解释被视为对普京道歉的辩论。然后，本文继续讨论“战争知识”所蕴含的认知政治，并认为寻找内部敌人的倾向可能有助于排除某些学术解释。最后，本文考虑了学者们如何以避免复制克里姆林宫战争宣传的方式再现俄罗斯叙事。