Conventional anti-corruption approaches focus on detecting and punishing the misuse of public office. These approaches are often ineffective in settings where social norms do not support reporting and punishing corruption. Attempting to build anti-corruption norms, we conducted a field experiment in Uganda that offered elected, local leaders the chance to earn awards for overseeing development projects according to legal guidelines. We then conducted a second field experiment that informed other leaders and the public about the award winners. Offering leaders the chance to earn recognition did not improve the management of projects or change leaders’ norms about corruption. Informing other leaders and residents about the award winners also did not change behaviors or attitudes related to corruption. A paired ethnographic study shows that the possibility for recognition generated excitement but was not able to overcome resignation by local leaders. Our study provides some of the first experimental evidence about using awards to motivate public officials to act with integrity and to build anti-corruption norms among both leaders and the public. The results imply that awards have limited effects for anti-corruption in settings with endemic corruption and where they cannot be used instrumentally by awardees.

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反腐败裁决的局限性：来自乌干达的实验和人种学证据

传统的反腐败方法侧重于发现和惩罚滥用公职的行为。在社会规范不支持举报和惩罚腐败的环境中，这些方法往往无效。为了建立反腐败规范，我们在乌干达进行了一项实地实验，为当选的地方领导人提供根据法律指导监督发展项目而获奖的机会。然后，我们进行了第二次实地实验，向其他领导人和公众介绍了获奖者。为领导者提供获得认可的机会并没有改善项目管理或改变领导者关于腐败的规范。向其他领导人和居民通报获奖者也没有改变与腐败相关的行为或态度。一项配对的民族志研究表明，获得认可的可能性令人兴奋，但无法克服当地领导人的辞职情绪。我们的研究提供了一些关于利用奖项来激励公职人员诚信行事并在领导人和公众之间建立反腐败规范的一些初步实验证据。结果表明，在腐败盛行且获奖者无法有效利用奖项的情况下，奖项对反腐败的作用有限。