We investigate the impact of the Dodd–Frank Act (DFA) on the credit risk behavior of complex bank holding companies (BHCs). Specifically, we assess the effectiveness of the DFA in reducing the credit riskiness of complex banks. Consistent with the moral hazard hypothesis, we find that complex BHCs affected by the DFA increase their credit risk. We argue that possible explanations are that BHCs decreased their lending portfolio quality, loan monitoring, and strength and independence of the risk management function after the DFA. The results are robust to endogeneity concerns, different sample selection criteria, various model and treatment specifications, and placebo tests.

中文翻译：

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多德-弗兰克法案后 BHC 的贷款和风险控制

我们研究了多德弗兰克法案 (DFA) 对复杂银行控股公司 (BHC) 信用风险行为的影响。具体来说，我们评估了 DFA 在降低复杂银行信用风险方面的有效性。与道德风险假说一致，我们发现受 DFA 影响的复杂 BHC 会增加其信用风险。我们认为，可能的解释是，DFA 后，BHC 降低了贷款组合质量、贷款监控以及风险管理职能的强度和独立性。结果对于内生性问题、不同的样本选择标准、各种模型和治疗规范以及安慰剂测试是稳健的。