当前位置: X-MOL 学术J. Financ. › 论文详情
Our official English website, www.x-mol.net, welcomes your feedback! (Note: you will need to create a separate account there.)
Auctions with Endogenous Initiation
Journal of Finance ( IF 7.915 ) Pub Date : 2023-11-02 , DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13288
ALEXANDER S. GORBENKO , ANDREY MALENKO

We study initiation of takeover auctions by potential buyers and the seller. A bidder's indication of interest reveals that she is optimistic about the target. If bidders' values have a substantial common component, as in takeover battles between financial bidders, this effect disincentivizes bidders from indicating interest, and auctions are seller-initiated. Conversely, in private-value auctions, such as battles between strategic bidders, equilibria can feature both seller- and bidder-initiated auctions, with the likelihood of the latter decreasing in commonality of values and the probability of a forced sale by the seller. We also relate initiation to bids and auction outcomes.

中文翻译:

内生发起的拍卖

我们研究潜在买家和卖家发起收购拍卖。投标人表现出的兴趣表明她对目标持乐观态度。如果投标人的价值观有很大的共同成分,就像在金融投标人之间的收购战中一样,这种效应会抑制投标人表现出兴趣,并且拍卖是由卖方发起的。相反,在私人价值拍卖中,例如战略投标人之间的战斗,均衡可以同时存在卖方和投标人发起的拍卖,后者的价值通用性可能会降低,并且卖方强制出售的可能性也可能会降低。我们还将发起与投标和拍卖结果联系起来。
更新日期:2023-11-02
down
wechat
bug