By using the data of firms listed on the three major US stock exchanges—the New York Stock Exchange, Nasdaq Stock Exchange, and American Stock Exchange—this study investigated (1) whether CEO overconfidence increases additional risk-taking and affects firm value, (2) whether high incentive compensation for overconfident CEOs increases additional risk-taking behavior and firm value, and (3) whether financial constraints reduce overconfident CEOs’ additional risk-taking and firm value. Our empirical results reveal significant differences in the variable data between the subsamples of firms with an overconfident CEO versus and those with a non-overconfident CEO. The firms with an overconfident CEO had more additional risk-taking, higher firm value, and more financial constraints than those with a non-overconfident CEO did. CEO overconfidence had significant positive associations with additional risk-taking and firm value, indicating that CEO overconfidence has a positive effect on firm overinvestment. Although overconfidence sometimes distorts investment decisions, it also leads to risky but valuable investments. Offering incentive compensation can incentivize CEOs to engage in additional risk-taking behaviors that increase firm value. This result indicates that offering a greater amount of incentive compensation encourages CEOs to take additional risks because they can gain higher compensation from making valuable investments that increase their firm’s value. In this study, incentive compensation was more likely to motivate risk-taking leading to increase firm value in non-overconfident CEOs than in overconfident CEOs. That is, granting non-overconfident CEOs a high percentage of incentive compensation can align their interests with those of shareholders and encourage more rational risk-taking. Compared with firms with overconfident CEOs, those with non-overconfident CEOs that were subject to higher financial constraints exhibited a less significant decrease in additional risk-taking but a more significant decrease in firm value.

通过使用美国三大证券交易所（纽约证券交易所、纳斯达克证券交易所和美国证券交易所）上市公司的数据，本研究调查了（1）首席执行官过度自信是否会增加额外的风险承担并影响公司价值，（ 2）过度自信的首席执行官的高激励薪酬是否会增加额外的风险承担行为和公司价值，以及（3）财务约束是否会减少过度自信的首席执行官的额外风险承担和公司价值。我们的实证结果揭示了首席执行官过度自信的公司与首席执行官非过度自信的公司子样本之间的变量数据存在显着差异。与首席执行官不过度自信的公司相比，首席执行官过度自信的公司有更多的额外风险、更高的公司价值和更多的财务约束。CEO过度自信与额外风险承担和公司价值显着正相关，表明CEO过度自信对公司过度投资有正向影响。虽然过度自信有时会扭曲投资决策，但也会导致有风险但有价值的投资。提供激励性薪酬可以激励首席执行官采取额外的冒险行为，从而增加公司价值。这一结果表明，提供更多的激励性薪酬会鼓励首席执行官承担额外的风险，因为他们可以通过进行有价值的投资来增加公司的价值，从而获得更高的薪酬。在这项研究中，与过度自信的首席执行官相比，激励性薪酬更有可能激发非过度自信的首席执行官承担风险，从而增加公司价值。也就是说，给予不过度自信的首席执行官高比例的激励薪酬可以使他们的利益与股东的利益保持一致，并鼓励更理性的冒险。与首席执行官过度自信的公司相比，首席执行官非过度自信且财务约束较高的公司在额外风险承担方面的下降幅度较小，但公司价值的下降却更为显着。