The aim of this paper is to assess an objection to amnesties conferred in transitional justice contexts: that they violate the rule of law. The paper begins by setting out the objection and presenting three possible replies to it. Each is argued to be unsatisfactory. The central contention of the paper, namely that the success of the objection depends on amnesties’ terms and the reasons for which they are introduced, as well as on what conception of the rule of law is operative, is then presented. The argument that amnesties violate the rule of law on account of public international law, or national constitutions containing bills of rights, prohibiting their use without exception is then rebutted. Few amnesties violate the rule of law for this reason. Finally, the paper addresses a further rule of law-based objection to amnesties that is related to, yet distinct from, the objection that amnesties violate the rule of law. According to this second rule of law-based objection, amnesties prevent, or at least hinder, the restoration of the rule of law in post-conflict societies. This objection is countered by demonstrating that amnesties do not always promote the rule of law less effectively than trials and punishment and may even, in some cases, be essential for the restoration of the rule of law.

本文的目的是评估对过渡时期司法背景下给予特赦的反对意见：它们违反了法治。本文首先提出了反对意见，并提出了三种可能的答复。每一个都被认为是不令人满意的。然后提出了本文的中心论点，即反对的成功取决于大赦的条款和引入这些条款的原因，以及适用的法治概念。然后，反驳了这样的论点，即由于国际公法或包含权利法案的国家宪法无一例外地禁止特赦的使用，特赦违反了法治。因此，很少有特赦违反法治。最后，本文提出了基于法治的对大赦的进一步反对意见，该反对意见与大赦违反法治的反对意见相关但又不同。根据第二个基于法治的反对意见，大赦阻止或至少阻碍冲突后社会法治的恢复。这一反对意见得到了反驳，证明大赦促进法治的效果并不总是不如审判和惩罚，甚至在某些情况下对于恢复法治至关重要。