Policymakers frequently use guarantees to mitigate panic-based runs in the financial system. We analyze a binary-action coordination game under the global games framework and propose a novel intervention program that screens investors based on their heterogeneous beliefs about the system's stability. The program only attracts investors who are at the margin of running, and their participation boosts all investors' confidence in the financial system. Compared with government guarantee programs, our proposed program is as effective at mitigating runs but features two advantages: it costs less to implement and it is robust to moral hazard.

中文翻译：

---

在恐慌运行中进行筛查干预

政策制定者经常使用担保来缓解金融体系中的恐慌性挤兑。我们分析了全球博弈框架下的二元行动协调博弈，并提出了一种新颖的干预方案，根据投资者对系统稳定性的不同信念来筛选投资者。该计划只吸引处于边缘的投资者，他们的参与增强了所有投资者对金融体系的信心。与政府担保计划相比，我们提出的计划在缓解挤兑方面同样有效，但具有两个优点：实施成本较低，并且对道德风险具有鲁棒性。