We explore the reasons behind corporate dividend changes and factors driving those changes during 2001–2021 in Oman, as a unique environment. The implications of our paper contrast with the relevant existing literature which demonstrates a positive correlation between dividends and stock prices in Oman, in support of the signaling theory. Employing multiple methods and after controlling for the nonlinearity in the profitability process, we find virtually no evidence for the signaling theory of dividends for dividend reductions, in terms of future earnings. Furthermore, our analysis affirms the importance of current profitability in influencing the magnitude of and the propensity to change (increase or decrease) dividends in listed Omani firms. We also find that the catering theory of dividends does not have any explanatory power on dividend changes. Further, firms’ life-cycle status and real investments have been found to significantly affect the decision to change dividends. Our results, which depart from the findings in the conventional literature, can be attributed to the distinct institutional features in Oman. Our game-theoretic model of dividend signaling/dividend catering provides some explanations.

我们探讨了阿曼独特环境下 2001 年至 2021 年期间企业股息变化背后的原因以及推动这些变化的因素。我们论文的含义与现有的相关文献形成鲜明对比，现有文献表明阿曼的股息与股价之间呈正相关，支持了信号理论。采用多种方法并在控制盈利过程中的非线性之后，我们几乎没有发现就未来收益而言股息减少的股息信号理论的证据。此外，我们的分析肯定了当前盈利能力对影响阿曼上市公司股息的幅度和变化（增加或减少）股息的倾向的重要性。我们还发现，股利迎合理论对股利变化没有任何解释力。此外，公司的生命周期状态和实际投资被发现会显着影响改变股息的决定。我们的结果与传统文献的发现不同，可以归因于阿曼独特的制度特征。我们的股息信号/股息迎合博弈论模型提供了一些解释。