A sender wants to persuade multiple homogeneous receivers to vote in favor of a proposal. Before the vote sender commits to a signal which sends private, potentially correlated, messages to receivers that are contingent on the true state of the world. The best equilibrium for sender in the resulting incomplete information game is unappealing: all receivers vote in favor of sender's preferred outcome, irrespective of their message. We therefore focus on the equilibrium where receivers vote sincerely, that is they vote in favor of the outcome that is optimal given their posterior. We characterize the optimal public and the optimal private signal, both for the case where receivers are behavioral and vote sincerely as well as the case where such behavior is a Bayes–Nash equilibrium (BNE). For the optimal public signal, sincere voting is a BNE, but the optimal private signal is subject to the swing voter's curse. Imposing the constraint that sincere voting be a BNE leads to an optimal signal where receivers are never pivotal.

中文翻译：

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说服真诚且有策略的选民

发送者想要说服多个同质接收者投票赞成某个提案。在投票发送者承诺向接收者发送私人的、可能相关的消息之前，这些消息取决于世界的真实状态。在由此产生的不完整信息游戏中，发送者的最佳平衡是没有吸引力的：所有接收者都投票支持发送者的首选结果，无论他们的消息是什么。因此，我们关注接收者真诚投票的均衡，即他们投票支持给定其后验的最佳结果。我们描述了最优公共信号和最优私人信号，无论是接收者行为并真诚投票的情况，还是这种行为是贝叶斯-纳什均衡（BNE）的情况。对于最优的公共信号来说，真诚投票是BNE，但最优的私人信号却会受到摇摆选民的诅咒。施加一个限制，即真诚投票是 BNE，会产生最佳信号，而接收者永远不是关键。