I study why some cities have strict land use regulation, how regulation affects the U.S. economy, and how policymakers can mitigate its negative consequences. I develop a quantitative spatial equilibrium model where local regulation is determined endogenously, by voting. Landowners in productive cities with attractive amenities vote for strict regulation. The model accounts for 40% of the observed differences in regulation across cities. Quantitative experiments show that excessive local regulation reduces aggregate productivity, but not necessarily welfare because, unlike renters, landowners benefit from regulation. I propose federal policies that raise productivity and welfare by weakening incentives to regulate land use.

我研究为什么一些城市有严格的土地使用监管、监管如何影响美国经济，以及政策制定者如何减轻其负面影响。我开发了一个定量空间平衡模型，其中地方监管是通过投票内生决定的。拥有有吸引力设施的生产力城市的土地所有者投票支持严格监管。该模型解释了观察到的各城市监管差异的 40%。定量实验表明，过度的地方监管会降低总生产率，但不一定会降低福利，因为与租客不同，土地所有者从监管中受益。我提出了通过削弱管制土地使用的激励措施来提高生产力和福利的联邦政策。