The growing literature explaining why repressive regimes ratify human rights treaties fails to explain why some regimes take the additional step to delegate authority to their people to file international legal complaints while others do not. I examine individual petition mechanisms in the United Nations which allow individuals to file complaints to an overseeing treaty body. I argue that repressive regimes face international incentives to signal their commitment to the European Union, a global power with a strong and continued interest in the global human rights regime. Repressive regimes, however, only ratify agreements when they perceive low domestic costs with little institutional constraints on the executive. In support of my theory, I find that repressive regimes are more likely to ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’ Optional Protocol allowing individual petitions when they are trade dependent on the EU while facing lesser institutional constraints, both legislative and judicial. The results are similar to explaining treaty ratification, but the interaction is substantively larger for OP ratification among repressive countries, highlighting the increased costs repressive leaders face to allowing individual petitions. Individual standing in the overseeing body of the ICCPR is one example of non-state actor access in international institutions, which is an important component of understanding institutional design and compliance.

越来越多的文献解释了为什么专制政权批准人权条约，但未能解释为什么一些政权采取额外措施将权力授予其人民提出国际法律申诉，而另一些政权却没有。我研究了联合国的个人请愿机制，该机制允许个人向监督条约机构提出申诉。我认为，镇压政权面临国际激励来表明其对欧盟的承诺，欧盟是一个对全球人权制度有着强烈和持续兴趣的全球大国。然而，专制政权只有在认为国内成本较低且对行政部门几乎没有制度约束时才会批准协议。为了支持我的理论，我发现专制政权更有可能批准《公民权利和政治权利国际公约》的《任择议定书》，当它们在贸易上依赖欧盟时，允许个人请愿，同时面临较少的立法和司法制度限制。结果与解释条约批准情况类似，但专制国家之间批准《议定书》的相互作用要大得多，这突显了专制领导人允许个人请愿所面临的成本增加。个人在《公民权利和政治权利国际公约》监督机构中的地位是非国家行为者进入国际机构的一个例子，这是理解机构设计和合规性的重要组成部分。