Analysis of revolutions typically focuses on de jure constitutions and how their elite- or mass-led character influences their consequences. De facto constitutions are political and economic rules that people use to govern themselves which may or may not be recognized in the evolving de jure constitution. We argue that the nature of change resulting from revolutions depends on whether the emergent constitutional order recognizes the autonomy of de facto constitutions. We theorize neglect, disregard, and hostility toward de facto constitutions contributes to cycles of constitutional instability. We use this theory to explain Afghanistan’s unending revolution. Neither elite-led nor mass-led revolutions in Afghanistan produced a lasting constitutional order because they share a disregard for the de facto constitution.

对革命的分析通常侧重于法律上的宪法以及其精英或群众领导的特征如何影响其后果。事实上的宪法是人们用来管理自己的政治和经济规则，这些规则可能会或可能不会在不断发展的法律宪法中得到承认。我们认为，革命引起的变革的性质取决于新兴的宪政秩序是否承认事实上的宪法的自治权。我们理论上认为，忽视、漠视和敌视事实上的宪法会导致宪法不稳定的循环。我们用这个理论来解释阿富汗永无休止的革命。阿富汗的精英领导的革命和群众领导的革命都没有产生持久的宪政秩序，因为它们都漠视事实上的宪法。