Jonna Vance and Preston Werner argue that humans’ mechanisms of perceptual attention tend to be sensitive to morally relevant properties. They dub this tendency “Attentional Moral Perception” (AMP) and argue that it can play all the explanatory roles that some theorists have hoped moral perception can play. In this article, I argue that, although AMP can indeed play some important explanatory roles, there are certain crucial things that AMP cannot do. Firstly, many theorists appeal to moral perception to explain how moral knowledge is possible. I argue that AMP cannot put an agent in a position to acquire moral knowledge unless it is supplemented with some other capacity for becoming aware of moral properties. Secondly, theorists appeal to moral perception to explain “moral conversions”, i.e., cases in which an experience leads an agent to form a moral belief that conflicts with her pre-existing moral beliefs. I argue that AMP cannot explain this either. Due to these shortcomings, theorists should turn to emotions for a powerful and psychologically realistic account of virtuous agents’ sensitivity to the moral landscape.

中文翻译：

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注意力道德知觉不能做什么，但情绪可以做什么

乔娜·万斯和普雷斯顿·沃纳认为，人类的感知注意机制往往对道德相关的属性很敏感。他们将这种趋势称为“注意道德知觉”（AMP），并认为它可以发挥一些理论家希望道德知觉能够发挥的所有解释作用。在本文中，我认为，虽然 AMP 确实可以发挥一些重要的解释作用，但有一些关键的事情 AMP 无法做到。首先，许多理论家诉诸道德感知来解释道德知识如何可能。我认为 AMP 不能使主体获得道德知识，除非它辅以其他一些了解道德属性的能力。其次，理论家诉诸道德感知来解释“道德转变”，即一种经验导致行为人形成与其先前存在的道德信念相冲突的道德信念的情况。我认为 AMP 也无法解释这一点。由于这些缺点，理论家应该转向情感，以对道德主体对道德景观的敏感性进行强有力的、心理上现实的解释。