This research examines the impact of occupational choices and tax evasion on the tax administration policy in a hierarchical tax model. The economy has two sectors, wage-earners and self-employment, with evasion only possible in the latter. Incorporating occupational decisions produces a smaller marginal tax rate and a larger budget for the IRS. However, the resources are still insufficient to audit all self-employed, resulting in distortions in occupational choices favoring self-employment. These distortions prevent production efficiency from achieving the optimum level, indicating that the Diamond-Mirrlees theorem is not applicable in this context. Finally, applying differential taxation represents a Pareto improvement, but it results in higher taxes for self-employment.

本研究探讨了分层税收模型中职业选择和逃税对税收管理政策的影响。经济有两个部门，工薪阶层和自营职业，只有后者才可能逃避。纳入职业决策将为国税局带来更小的边际税率和更大的预算。然而，资源仍然不足以审计所有个体经营者，导致职业选择有利于个体经营者的扭曲。这些扭曲阻碍了生产效率达到最佳水平，表明戴蒙德-米尔里斯定理在这种情况下不适用。最后，实行差别税代表帕累托改进，但它会导致自营职业者的税收更高。