We present evidence that clawback adoptions, by dissuading accruals management, motivate managers to shift capital investment mix from R&D to capex to preserve earnings-based compensation, thereby lowering capital investment efficiency. These effects are more pronounced for firms prone to financial misreporting, which is consistent with board incentives to adopt clawbacks, and with managerial incentives to substitute real for accruals-based earnings management to preserve performance-based compensation. Path analyses lend support to performance-based compensation serving as a channel through which clawback adoptions influence capital investment mix and efficiency. These findings extend and reinterpret prior findings and are timely given the Security and Exchange Commission's newly issued Rule 10D-1 that makes clawback provision adoptions a condition for U.S. exchange listings and explicitly requested “comment on any effect the proposed requirements may have on efficiency, competition, and capital formation.”

我们提供的证据表明，通过阻止应计管理，回拨的采用会激励管理者将资本投资组合从研发转向资本支出，以保留基于收益的薪酬，从而降低资本投资效率。对于容易出现财务误报的公司来说，这些影响更为明显，这与董事会采取回拨的激励措施以及管理层用实际盈余管理代替应计利润管理以保留基于绩效的薪酬的激励措施是一致的。路径分析支持基于绩效的薪酬作为回拨采用影响资本投资组合和效率的渠道。这些调查结果扩展并重新解释了先前的调查结果，并且考虑到美国证券交易委员会新发布的第 10D-1 规则，该规则将采用回拨条款作为在美国交易所上市的条件，并明确要求“对拟议要求可能对效率、竞争产生的任何影响发表评论”，这些调查结果是及时的。 ，以及资本形成。”