How does bureaucratic structure shape presidential strategy in managing top executive posts? The comparative literature on cabinet formation focuses heavily on presidential legislative strategy, largely overlooking the administrative dimension of cabinet management. This article fills this gap by examining how bureaucratic professionalization shapes the president's strategy in distributing and managing cabinet posts. We argue that as bureaucracies become more autonomous via professionalization, ministers from the bureaucracy are more likely to be central players in presidential cabinet management. Our analysis of original data on 1538 ministers' cabinet careers from 26 presidential administrations in four Asian democracies shows that bureaucrats are more likely to receive and retain cabinet posts in key policy areas as bureaucratic professionalization increases, whereas they are less likely to do so with decreasing bureaucratic professionalization. This finding suggests that presidential cabinet management follows a different set of rules according to the level of bureaucratic professionalization.

中文翻译：

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官僚专业化和内阁管理：总统民主国家的公务员如何受到不同的待遇


官僚结构如何影响总统管理高层管理职位的策略？关于内阁组建的比较文献主要关注总统的立法策略，很大程度上忽视了内阁管理的行政层面。本文通过研究官僚专业化如何影响总统分配和管理内阁职位的策略来填补这一空白。我们认为，随着官僚机构通过专业化变得更加自主，官僚机构的部长更有可能成为总统内阁管理的核心角色。我们对四个亚洲民主国家 26 届总统政府中 1538 名部长内阁生涯的原始数据进行分析表明，随着官僚专业化程度的提高，官僚在关键政策领域获得并保留内阁职位的可能性更大，而随着官僚专业化程度的降低，他们获得和保留关键政策领域内阁职位的可能性也随之降低。官僚专业化。这一发现表明，总统内阁管理根据官僚专业化水平遵循一套不同的规则。