We study the implications of different contractual forms in a market with an incumbent upstream monopolist and free downstream entry. We show that traditional conclusions regarding the desirability of linear contracts radically change when entry in the downstream market is endogenous rather than exogenous. By triggering more entry than two-part tariffs, wholesale price contracts can generate higher aggregate output, consumer surplus, and welfare. In light of this, the upstream monopolist may prefer to trade with wholesale price contracts as well as to give up part of its bargaining power when it is high.

中文翻译：

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纵向合同和下游进入*

我们研究了上游垄断者和下游自由进入的市场中不同合同形式的影响。我们表明，当下游市场的进入是内生的而不是外生的时，关于线性合约的可取性的传统结论会发生根本性的变化。通过触发比两部分关税更多的进入，批发价格合同可以产生更高的总产出、消费者剩余和福利。有鉴于此，上游垄断者可能更愿意以批发价合同进行交易，并在价格较高时放弃部分议价能力。