Firms often sell a transparent base product and a valuable add-on. If only some consumers are aware of the latter, the add-on's effect on the base product's price will be ambiguous. Cross-subsidization between products to bait uninformed consumers might lower, intrinsic utility from the add-on for informed consumers might raise the price. We study this trade-off in the gasoline market by exploiting an alcohol sales prohibition at stations as an exogenous shifter of add-on availability. Gasoline margins drop by 5% during the prohibition. The effect is mediated by shop variety and competition. Using traffic data, we unveil sizeable consumer-side reactions.

中文翻译：

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酒精饮料禁酒和定价*

公司通常销售透明的基础产品和有价值的附加产品。如果只有部分消费者意识到后者，那么附加产品对基础产品价格的影响将是模糊的。为了吸引不知情的消费者而进行的产品之间的交叉补贴可能会降低价格，而对于知情的消费者来说，附加产品的内在效用可能会提高价格。我们通过利用加油站的酒精销售禁令作为附加可用性的外生转变来研究汽油市场的这种权衡。禁令期间汽油利润下降 5%。这种影响是由商店品种和竞争调节的。利用流量数据，我们揭示了消费者方面的巨大反应。