Neurodevices that collect neural (or brain activity) data have been characterised as having the ability to register the inner workings of human mentality. There are concerns that the proliferation of such devices in the consumer-directed realm may result in the mass processing and commercialisation of neural data (as has been the case with social media data) and even threaten the mental privacy of individuals. To prevent this, some argue that all raw neural data should be conceptualised and regulated as “medical data” even if it is collected from consumer-directed devices in obviously non-clinical settings. In this paper, we argue that without a clearer formulation of what does and does not count as medical data, this approach might also uncritically enlarge the scope for medical influence and an unwarranted medicalisation of everyday aspects of mental life. Indeed, if we were to accept the position that all neural data is medical data because it offers insights into personally sensitive information (such a person’s thoughts, emotions, or intentions) then this could even unnecessarily expand the boundaries of medical data to other forms of data that otherwise seem to be non-clinical. If all brain data (neural activity data) is considered to be medical data even when collected from consumer-directed devices then we might unintentionally reduce meaningful distinctions between what is and what is not rightfully in the purview of medicine.

收集神经（或大脑活动）数据的神经设备的特点是能够记录人类心态的内部运作。有人担心，此类设备在消费者主导领域的扩散可能会导致神经数据的大规模处理和商业化（社交媒体数据就是这种情况），甚至威胁个人的心理隐私。为了防止这种情况发生，一些人认为所有原始神经数据都应该被概念化并作为“医学数据”进行监管，即使它是在明显非临床环境中从消费者导向的设备收集的。在本文中，我们认为，如果没有更清晰地阐明什么算作医学数据、什么不算作医学数据，这种方法也可能不加批判地扩大医学影响的范围，并对精神生活的日常方面进行无根据的医学化。事实上，如果我们接受所有神经数据都是医疗数据的立场，因为它提供了对个人敏感信息（例如一个人的想法、情绪或意图）的洞察，那么这甚至可能不必要地将医疗数据的边界扩展到其他形式的数据。否则看似非临床的数据。如果所有大脑数据（神经活动数据）都被认为是医学数据，即使是从消费者导向的设备收集的数据，那么我们可能会无意中减少医学范围内的数据和不正确的数据之间的有意义的区别。