In an earlier paper in Theoria, I discussed an argument based on the idea of “soul-switching” that attempted to undermine the immaterialist account of human beings. The present paper deals with a parity argument against that argument in which the idea of “body-switching” plays a pivotal role. I call these two arguments, that have been reported by Razi (d. 1210), respectively “the soul-switching argument” and “the body-switching argument”. After some introductory remarks, section 2 of the paper describes the structure of the latter argument. Section 3 considers some philosophical discussions in the ancient, modern, and contemporary eras in which the idea of body-switching (or some similar conception) plays a major role. In the following section 4, some criticisms of the argument are discussed and a general response that is meant to cover a broad range of objections is considered. This paper shows that the body-switching argument reported by Razi is a methodological antecedent of several contemporary arguments in defence of substance dualism.

中文翻译：

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论捍卫人性非物质性的身体转换论证

在《Theoria》早期的一篇论文中，我讨论了一个基于“灵魂转换”思想的论点，该论点试图破坏对人类的非物质主义解释。本文讨论了反对该论点的平等论点，其中“身体转换”的想法起着关键作用。我将拉齐（Razi，卒于 1210 年）报告的这两个论点分别称为“灵魂转换论点”和“身体转换论点”。在一些介绍性的评论之后，本文的第二部分描述了后一个论点的结构。第三节考虑了古代、现代和当代的一些哲学讨论，其中身体转换的思想（或一些类似的概念）发挥了重要作用。在接下来的第 4 节中，讨论了对该论点的一些批评，并考虑了旨在涵盖广泛反对意见的一般性回应。本文表明，拉齐报道的身体转换论点是当代捍卫物质二元论的几种论点的方法论前身。