The European Union (EU) increasingly seeks cooperation with transit and sending countries to prevent irregular migration and enforce returns. Yet, these countries have little incentives to engage in such cooperation. To overcome interest asymmetries, the EU has sought to link trade and migration control in its preferential trade agreements (PTAs). Drawing on a comprehensive dataset of migration provisions in all PTAs signed between 1960 and 2020 and a qualitative analysis of key policy documents, we show that the inclusion of such provisions does not follow patterns of interdependence and strategic priorities resulting from problem pressure. Rather, the proliferation of migration control provisions in EU PTAs is best explained by the institutional framework guiding the negotiation of these provisions. Whilst reflecting the political will to use PTAs as a ‘carrot’ to incite third-country cooperation, these findings also show the limits of targeted action on migration control via commercial policies.

中文翻译：

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欧盟市场力量在移民外部化方面的局限性：解释欧盟优惠贸易协定中的移民控制条款

欧盟 (EU) 越来越多地寻求与过境国和输出国合作，以防止非正常移民并强制遣返。然而，这些国家没有动力参与此类合作。为了克服利益不对称，欧盟寻求在其优惠贸易协定（PTA）中将贸易和移民控制联系起来。根据 1960 年至 2020 年间签署的所有 PTA 中移民条款的综合数据集以及对关键政策文件的定性分析，我们表明，此类条款的纳入并不遵循因问题压力而产生的相互依存和战略优先事项的模式。相反，欧盟特惠贸易协定中移民控制条款的激增最好的解释是指导这些条款谈判的制度框架。这些调查结果虽然反映了利用优惠贸易协定作为“胡萝卜”来刺激第三国合作的政治意愿，但也表明了通过商业政策进行有针对性的移民控制行动的局限性。