abstract:

In the past decade, education reforms implemented high-stakes teacher evaluation, limited tenure protections, and restricted collective bargaining. Large increases in compensation may be needed to offset these losses in employment protections to attract and retain teachers. We test this hypothesis by examining the impact of a set of policy changes implementing teacher evaluation, tying teacher tenure to performance, and restricting collective bargaining on teacher compensation in Michigan. We also explore the extent to which exposure to charter school competition moderates the effects of these reforms due to the fiscal impacts of charter competition. We find no evidence that districts increased teacher compensation in response to these reforms that arguably removed substantial teacher protections. If anything, districts decreased teacher compensation. Our results also indicate that these effects did not vary with the amount of competition from charter schools.

摘要：

在过去的十年中，教育改革实施了高风险的教师评估、有限的任期保护和有限的集体谈判。可能需要大幅增加薪酬来抵消就业保护方面的损失，以吸引和留住教师。我们通过考察密歇根州实施教师评估、将教师任期与绩效挂钩以及限制教师薪酬集体谈判等一系列政策变化的影响来检验这一假设。由于特许竞争的财政影响，我们还探讨了特许学校竞争在多大程度上缓和了这些改革的影响。我们没有发现任何证据表明各学区因这些可以说取消了实质性教师保护的改革而增加了教师薪酬。如果说有什么不同的话，那就是学区减少了教师的薪酬。我们的结果还表明，这些影响并不随着特许学校的竞争程度而变化。