Radio spectrum has become central to technological progress and economic growth. While, command-and-control regulatory institutions of the early twentieth century were considered necessary to counter endemic market failure, recent regulatory reform towards a market regime with flexible licensing creates an interesting environment for examining how complex externalities are managed by private contracting in decentralized systems. We present empirical evidence suggesting that adoption of a more “Coasean” policy regime in radio was followed by far more crowded wireless markets than were formed under rigid administrative structures. This is observed by contrasting pre-cellular mobile phone system outcomes in the U.S. (1946–1978) with the later evolution of cellular networks (1983–2015). The cellular marketplace exhibits exceedingly more complicated network coordination under liberalized property ownership rules. We nest our empirical findings within a conceptual framework derived from theoretical literature on property rights.

无线电频谱已成为技术进步和经济增长的核心。虽然二十世纪初的命令和控制监管机构被认为是应对普遍存在的市场失灵所必需的，但最近针对具有灵活许可的市场制度的监管改革为研究分散系统中的私人合同如何管理复杂的外部性创造了一个有趣的环境。我们提供的经验证据表明，在无线电领域采用更加“科斯式”的政策制度后，无线市场将比在严格的行政结构下形成的市场更加拥挤。这是通过将美国前蜂窝移动电话系统结果（1946-1978）与后来的蜂窝网络演进（1983-2015）进行对比观察到的。在自由化的财产所有权规则下，移动市场表现出极其复杂的网络协调。我们将我们的实证研究结果置于源自产权理论文献的概念框架内。