This paper examines the role of collateral in sudden stop models that feature occasionally binding constraints and endogenous growth. It shows how different assumptions regarding the nature and valuation of collateral alter the dynamics of crisis episodes and the welfare costs of pecuniary externalities. For example, in a model with land as collateral, valuing collateral at the “expected future price” leads to substantially weaker Fisherian deflation effects than the case with collateral valued at the “current price.” However, the average size of sudden stops in the two economies are similar because households endogenously avoid the region where large sudden stops would occur. The differences between different collateral valuations and the size of sudden stops are amplified when we abstract from endogenous growth. In another case, assuming collateral is income rather than land leads to smaller sudden stops as income is less volatile than asset prices. Finally, we show that some choices lead to constrained or conditionally efficient allocations whereas others generate inefficiencies, but these inefficiencies are small.

中文翻译：

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抵押品在突然停止模型中的作用

本文研究了抵押品在突然停止模型中的作用，该模型的特点是偶尔具有约束力和内生增长。它显示了关于抵押品的性质和估值的不同假设如何改变危机事件的动态和货币外部性的福利成本。例如，在以土地作为抵押品的模型中，以“预期未来价格”对抵押品进行估值会导致费舍尔通货紧缩效应比以“当前价格”对抵押品进行估值的情况要弱得多。然而，两个经济体的突然停顿的平均规模相似，因为家庭本能地避开会发生大规模突然停顿的区域。当我们从内生增长中抽象出来时，不同抵押品估值之间的差异和突然停止的规模就会被放大。在另一种情况下，假设抵押品是收入而不是土地，会导致较小的突然停止，因为收入的波动性低于资产价格。最后，我们表明一些选择会导致受限或有条件的有效分配，而其他选择则会导致效率低下，但这些低效率很小。