We suggest a new component efficient solution for monotonic TU games with a coalition structure, the conditional Shapley value. In contrast to other such solutions, it satisfies the null player property. Nevertheless, it accounts for the players’ outside options in productive components of coalition structures. For all monotonic games, there exist coalition structures that are stable under the conditional Shapley value. For voting games, such stable coalition structures support Gamson’s theory of coalition formation (Gamson, 1961).

中文翻译：

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空玩家、外部选项和稳定性：条件 Shapley 值

我们为具有联盟结构的单调 TU 博弈提出了一种新的组件有效解决方案，即条件 Shapley 值。与其他此类解决方案相比，它满足空玩家属性。然而，它考虑了参与者在联盟结构的生产组成部分中的外部选择。对于所有单调博弈，都存在在条件沙普利值下稳定的联盟结构。对于投票博弈，这种稳定的联盟结构支持 Gamson 的联盟形成理论（Gamson，1961）。