This study develops a view of Hume’s is/ought distinction as an extension of Scottish jurisprudence that, in turn, was influenced by Pufendorf’s discussion of entia moralia. Further, it investigates the unique role that Hume’s sentimentalism played in the production of elements in the context of liberalism under the rule of law, independently of previous philosophical traditions.

First, we observe that Hume’s is/ought distinction corresponds to a distinction between uncivilized and civilized entities, rather than between amoral rationality and moral passions. Next, analyzing Hume’s argument for “moral evidence,” we find that such evidence is necessary for various activities, such as consent or trading, in the field of moral entities as civil societies. Finally, a study of Hume’s stance with respect to civil and common laws shows that his moral sentimentalism, which includes the is/ought distinction and moral evidence, suggests a new possibility for social development that is distinct from previous rational forms of jurisprudence. From this discussion, a unique sprout of modern liberalism can be seen in Hume’s theory of justice.

这项研究提出了一种观点，即休谟的“是/应该”区分是苏格兰法理学的延伸，而苏格兰法理学又受到普芬多夫关于道德实体的讨论的影响。此外，它还探讨了休谟的感伤主义在法治下的自由主义背景下独立于先前的哲学传统而在要素生产中所发挥的独特作用。

首先，我们观察到休谟的“是/应该”的区分对应于不文明实体和文明实体之间的区别，而不是非道德理性和道德激情之间的区别。接下来，分析休谟关于“道德证据”的论点，我们发现这种证据对于公民社会等道德实体领域的各种活动（例如同意或交易）是必要的。最后，对休谟关于民法和普通法立场的研究表明，他的道德感伤主义，包括“是/应该”的区别和道德证据，为社会发展提出了一种不同于以往理性形式的法理学的新可能性。从这次讨论中，我们可以看到休谟正义理论中独特的现代自由主义萌芽。