This paper tackles Husserl’s early analysis of alien experience and its relation to the methodological framework of the Logical Investigations (LI). Since intersubjectivity first becomes a central theme for Husserl in his writings of 1905 (Seefeld Blätter), less attention is usually paid to his analysis of our experience of other minds in the LI. In this context, I attempt to highlight both the fundamental insights gained by Husserl in this analysis that will also remain key for his later accounts of empathy, as well as the challenges alien experiences raises for the theoretical framework of LI. I begin by discussing the main relevant traits of the phenomenological project of LI as a preparatory endeavor for the elucidation of logical objectualities, and the radical way in which Husserl defines its domain, i.e., the sphere of immanent content. Then I analyse Husserl’s understanding of alien experience in terms of an indicative unity based on associative motivations. I argue that, in doing this, Husserl accounts for a non-inferential intuitive access to other minds and, at the same time, maintains their essential alienness. Finally, I show that this account rests on what I call an “intentional contamination” of Husserl’s reductive method of LI.

本文探讨了胡塞尔对外星人经验的早期分析及其与逻辑研究（LI）方法论框架的关系。由于主体间性在胡塞尔 1905 年的著作中首次成为中心主题（Seefeld Blätter），因此人们通常较少关注他对我们在 LI 中其他心灵的经验的分析。在这种背景下，我试图强调胡塞尔在这一分析中获得的基本见解（这些见解对于他后来对移情的阐述仍然至关重要），以及外来经验对 LI 理论框架提出的挑战。我首先讨论作为阐明逻辑对象性的准备工作的 LI 现象学计划的主要相关特征，以及胡塞尔定义其领域（即内在内容领域）的激进方式。然后我从基于联想动机的指示性统一的角度分析了胡塞尔对外来经验的理解。我认为，在这样做时，胡塞尔解释了对其他思想的非推理直觉访问，同时保持了他们本质上的陌生性。最后，我表明这个解释是基于我所说的胡塞尔的 LI 还原方法的“故意污染”。