This paper estimates the impact of accountability scores on Brazilian higher education. We implement a regression discontinuity design to explore a natural experiment resulting from the federal rules for assigning quality levels to undergraduate programs. We test whether program quality is sensitive to negative reinforcement, such as punishments imposed when a minimum threshold is not attained. The findings indicate that program administrators exhibit a positive response to the prospect of punishment by enhancing program quality in the subsequent evaluation cycle. The primary drivers of this advancement – infrastructure, teaching and learning evaluations, faculty dedication, and the proportion of faculty with a Ph.D. degree – are largely under the administrators’ direct control. However, quality indicators less subject to administrative manipulation, such as student performance and value-added measures, exhibit minimal change.

本文估计了责任分数对巴西高等教育的影响。我们采用断点回归设计来探索根据联邦本科课程质量水平分配规则产生的自然实验。我们测试程序质量是否对负强化敏感，例如未达到最低阈值时施加的惩罚。研究结果表明，项目管理者通过在随后的评估周期中提高项目质量，对惩罚的前景表现出积极的反应。这一进步的主要驱动力是基础设施、教学评估、教师奉献精神以及拥有博士学位的教师比例。学位——很大程度上处于管理者的直接控制之下。然而，质量指标较少受到行政操纵，例如学生表现和增值措施，变化很小。