I offer two objections to luck egalitarianism. The no-adequate-account objection takes note of the egalitarian insistence that the disvalue of inequality is only one of a plurality of values or disvalues that needs to be considered in arriving at a judgment about the ranking of alternative distributions of welfare. This turn to pluralism places a reasonable demand upon luck egalitarianism to provide an account of how the different sorts of values or disvalues that are supposed to attach to available distributions of welfare are to be aggregated or weighed against one another in that ranking procedure. I contend that the prospects for developing such an account are dim and that some salient responses to this objection misfire. The churlishness-envy objection against luck egalitarianism is that this doctrine countenances envy directed toward the faultless good fortune of others. This objection places a reasonable demand on luck egalitarians to formulate a version of their doctrine that does not underwrite envious responses toward those who gain through brute good luck. I contend that the most auspicious path toward satisfying the demand not to underwrite churlish envy advances a luck egalitarianism that asymmetrically affirms the badness of arbitrary disadvantage rather than the badness of both arbitrary disadvantage and arbitrary advantage. Since this is the strategy pursued in Shlomi Segall’s Why Inequality Matters, I offer critiques of Segall’s initial and revised versions of asymmetrical egalitarianism in support of my conclusion that luck egalitarianism seems unable to rebut or sidestep the churlishness-envy objection. I conclude that luck egalitarianism seems unable to satisfy either of the two reasonable demands upon it that I raise.

中文翻译：

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对运气均等主义者的两个要求

我对运气均等主义提出两个反对意见。不充分账户反对意见注意到平等主义者坚持认为，不平等的贬值只是在对福利的替代分配的排名做出判断时需要考虑的多种价值观或贬值之一。这种向多元化的转变对运气平均主义提出了合理的要求，以提供一种解释，说明如何在排序过程中将与现有福利分配相关的不同类型的价值或贬值进行汇总或相互权衡。我认为，建立这样一个账户的前景很暗淡，而且对这一反对意见的一些突出回应也没有成功。对运气均等主义的粗暴嫉妒反对是，这种学说支持针对他人完美无缺的好运的嫉妒。这一反对意见对运气均等主义者提出了合理的要求，要求他们制定一个版本的学说，不支持对那些通过残酷的好运气获得的人的嫉妒反应。我认为，满足不支持粗暴嫉妒的要求的最吉祥的道路是提出一种运气平均主义，这种运气不对称地肯定任意劣势的坏处，而不是任意劣势和任意优势的坏处。由于这是什洛米·西格尔在《为什么不平等很重要》中所追求的策略，因此我对西格尔的不对称平均主义的最初版本和修订版本提出了批评，以支持我的结论，即运气平均主义似乎无法反驳或回避粗暴嫉妒的反对意见。我的结论是，运气均等主义似乎无法满足我提出的两个合理要求中的任何一个。