Friedrich A. Hayek argues that “equality of the general rules of law and conduct” is the only kind of equality compatible with liberty and, moreover, that attempting to pursue equality along any other dimension is likely to destroy liberty. For Hayek, then, as a social philosopher and political economist who was principally concerned with understanding and promoting liberal order, the question “What kind of equality?” has a straightforward answer. Equality before the law, perhaps equality of opportunity in a procedural sense, is the equality that we should pursue, not material equality and certainly not equality of outcomes. One wonders, though, whether Hayek dismisses too quickly the more substantive forms of equality and, more importantly, whether we can achieve the liberal society that Hayek envisions without concerning ourselves with more than just the presence or absence of equality of the general rules of law and conduct. This essay will explore, criticize, and expand upon the way that Hayek makes use of equality in his conception of a free society. Specifically, we argue that Hayek may need a more substantive conception of equality than he is willing to deploy in order to arrive at the liberal society he hopes to bring about.

中文翻译：

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超越哈耶克平等

弗里德里希·A·哈耶克认为，“法律和行为的一般规则的平等”是与自由相容的唯一一种平等，而且，试图在任何其他方面追求平等都可能会摧毁自由。那么，对于哈耶克来说，作为一位主要关注理解和促进自由秩序的社会哲学家和政治经济学家，“什么样的平等？”这个问题 有一个简单的答案。法律面前的平等，也许是程序意义上的机会平等，才是我们应该追求的平等，而不是物质上的平等，更不是结果上的平等。然而，人们想知道，哈耶克是否太快地否定了更实质性的平等形式，更重要的是，我们是否能够实现哈耶克所设想的自由社会，而不必关心一般法律规则平等的存在与否。和行为。本文将探讨、批评和扩展哈耶克在其自由社会概念中利用平等的方式。具体来说，我们认为哈耶克可能需要比他愿意运用的更实质性的平等概念，以实现他希望实现的自由社会。