There are various egalitarian moral doctrines. They differ in the requirements they impose on institutions and social practices and on individual conduct. This essay sketches two versions of egalitarian social justice and claims that the requirements they impose should strike us as reasonable, all things considered. One is welfarist egalitarianism, a cousin of classical utilitarianism. This version requires bringing about good quality lives for people and fair (equal) distribution of this good across persons. A notable feature of welfarist egalitarianism is that it accommodates the seemingly antiegalitarian claim that it does not matter in itself how one person’s condition compares to that of another, so a fortiori it does not matter in itself whether or not one person’s condition compares to that of others in the one particular way of being equal. The other version is relational or freedom-oriented egalitarianism, which holds that we should above all ensure that people are free to live as they choose and relate as equals, without social hierarchy. In the latter half of the twentieth century, John Rawls developed a powerful articulation of relational egalitarian justice. This essay sketches the two rival egalitarianisms with a view to showing their respective moral attractiveness and to suggesting that the welfarist version has greater moral attraction.

中文翻译：

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平等的要求是合理的

平等主义道德学说有多种。它们对机构和社会实践以及个人行为的要求有所不同。本文概述了平等主义社会正义的两个版本，并声称，考虑到所有因素，它们所施加的要求应该让我们感到合理。一种是福利主义的平等主义，它是古典功利主义的近亲。这个版本要求为人们带来高质量的生活，并在人们之间公平（平等）地分配这种福利。福利主义平等主义的一个显着特征是，它容纳了看似反平等主义的主张，即一个人的状况与另一个人的状况相比如何本身并不重要，因此更不用说一个人的状况是否与另一个人的状况相比本身并不重要。其他人以一种特定的方式平等。另一种版本是关系型或以自由为导向的平等主义，它认为我们首先应该确保人们可以自由地选择生活并平等地交往，没有社会等级制度。在二十世纪下半叶，约翰·罗尔斯对关系平等主义正义进行了强有力的阐述。本文概述了两种相互竞争的平等主义，以展示它们各自的道德吸引力，并表明福利主义版本具有更大的道德吸引力。