This article challenges the contemporary negative and dismissive narratives about distressed debt hedge funds (DDHFs), a subset of holdout creditors. A soft normative framework for regulating this category of creditors and other holdout creditors is however proposed to address their disruptive activities in the sovereign debt market. It is proposed that the Basel III framework be a conduit for enforcing the proposed normative framework because hedge funds are customers of institutions subject to Basel III oversight. One of the characteristics of these funds is their relatively sophisticated and high use of leverage. The authors therefore envisage the Basel III framework being expanded to provide for enforcement in this context. Finally, the normative framework proposed in this article differs from previous proposals including the Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM) and contractual solutions including Collective Action Clauses (CACs) and exit consents as it proposes the Basel III framework as an enforcement mechanism and is not a contractual solution.

中文翻译：

---

主权债务市场中顽固债权人的监管规范框架

本文挑战了当代关于不良债务对冲基金的负面和轻蔑的叙述（DDHFs)，抵制债权人的子集。然而，建议建立一个软规范框架来监管此类债权人和其他顽固债权人，以解决他们在主权债务市场上的破坏性活动。建议巴塞尔三、框架成为执行拟议规范框架的渠道，因为对冲基金是受巴塞尔约束的机构的客户三、监督。这些基金的特点之一是其相对复杂且杠杆率较高。因此，作者设想巴塞尔三、框架正在扩大，以提供这方面的执法。最后，本文提出的规范框架与包括主权债务重组机制在内的先前提案有所不同（SDRM）和合同解决方案，包括集体行动条款（CACs) 并同意退出巴塞尔协议三、框架作为一种执行机制，而不是合同解决方案。