This paper presents a “behavioral” model of a normative benevolent social planner, who faces a self-control problem when he/she is in charge of aggregating diverse and conflicting preferences of individuals. The model is presented in the context of aggregating preferences over intertemporal streams of social outcomes, in which Zuber and Jackson and Yariv have shown the impossibility of a time-consistent and Paretian social objective function. Unlike previous studies, our investigation focuses on the compatibility of the Pareto condition with the impure social planner who has a dynamically consistent self-control utility function characterized by Gul and Pesendorfer. Assuming that the social planner is tempted to adopt the majority's opinion when there is a conflict of opinions among individuals, the paper characterizes an aggregation form in which the planner is allowed to depart from dictatorship in ex-post choice under noncommitment.

中文翻译：

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不纯粹的仁慈计划者的诱惑与自我控制：异质贴现案例


本文提出了一个规范的仁慈社会计划者的“行为”模型，当他/她负责汇总个人的不同和相互冲突的偏好时，他/她面临着自我控制问题。该模型是在对跨期社会结果流的偏好聚合的背景下提出的，其中 Zuber、Jackson 和 Yariv 证明了时间一致的帕累托社会目标函数的不可能性。与之前的研究不同，我们的研究重点是帕累托条件与不纯社会规划者的兼容性，后者具有以古尔和佩森多弗为特征的动态一致的自我控制效用函数。假设当个人之间存在意见冲突时，社会规划者倾向于采纳多数人的意见，本文描述了一种聚合形式，其中允许规划者在不承诺的情况下进行事后选择，摆脱独裁。