This article asks how to allocate human rights obligations stemming from the European Convention on Human Rights and defends an interpretivist account of human rights based on the values of integrity and equality to answer it. First, it considers the structure of rights and argues that human rights usually require a duty bearer who needs to be identified. Second, the article analyses interest-based theories of human rights and shows that they do not speak to the allocation of duties. Third, I argue that duties can only be allocated relying on a normative principle and that an interpretivist account of human rights allows for underlying values to be identified. Fourth, I show that these values should be understood to be integrity and equality. Finally, the article applies the framework to the judgment in Carter v Russia, showing that an explicitly normative account supplies principled distinctions where other approaches cannot.

中文翻译：

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在欧洲人权法院中分配人权义务

本文询问如何分配《欧洲人权公约》所规定的人权义务，并捍卫基于正直和平等价值观的人权解释主义解释来回答这个问题。首先，它考虑了权利的结构，并认为人权通常需要一个需要确定的义务承担者。其次，文章分析了基于利益的人权理论，并表明它们并不涉及义务的分配。第三，我认为只能根据规范性原则来分配义务，并且对人权的解释主义解释可以识别潜在的价值观。第四，我表明这些价值观应该被理解为正直和平等。最后，本文将该框架应用于卡特诉俄罗斯案的判决，表明明确的规范性解释提供了其他方法无法提供的原则性区别。