Auditor changes are significant corporate events marking disruptions in the auditor-client relationship. Prior studies have primarily examined the impact of such changes on audit quality and investment decisions of market participants. We study the effect of auditor changes on the voluntary disclosure of forward-looking information. Managers may choose to reduce disclosure due to the possible adverse effect of the disruptions on disclosure credibility. Alternatively, shareholders may demand increased disclosure to intensify monitoring, as the auditor change signals potential issues between the company and the auditor. Employing multiple identification strategies, we find that firms are less likely to issue management earnings forecasts (MEFs) following auditor changes. We also find that governance quality mitigates the negative impact of auditor changes on the issuance of MEFs. Additionally, auditor changes are associated with lower market reactions to forecast releases. The overall evidence is consistent with the notion of reduced forecast credibility. Lastly, we conduct cross-sectional analyses on characteristics of the auditor changes and find evidence consistent with signaling and anticipated successor audit quality to be underlying mechanisms for the association between auditor changes and MEFs. Our study provides the first large sample evidence that auditor changes have a disruptive effect on the voluntary disclosure of forward-looking information.

中文翻译：

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审计师变更和管理层发布盈利预测

审计师变更是标志着审计师与客户关系中断的重大公司事件。先前的研究主要考察了此类变化对审计质量和市场参与者投资决策的影响。我们研究审计师变更对前瞻性信息自愿披露的影响。由于中断可能对披露可信度产生不利影响，管理人员可能会选择减少披露。或者，股东可能会要求增加披露以加强监控，因为审计师的变更表明公司与审计师之间存在潜在问题。采用多种识别策略，我们发现公司在审计师变更后发布管理层盈利预测（MEF）的可能性较小。我们还发现，治理质量减轻了审计师变更对 MEF 发行的负面影响。此外，审计师的变动与市场对预测发布的反应较低有关。总体证据与预测可信度降低的概念是一致的。最后，我们对审计师变更的特征进行横断面分析，并找到与信号和预期继任审计质量一致的证据，作为审计师变更与 MEF 之间关联的基本机制。我们的研究提供了第一个大样本证据，证明审计师变更对前瞻性信息的自愿披露具有破坏性影响。