This paper evaluates the extent to which public interest or public choice rationales explain timber industry regulation in the Pacific Northwest. Two key regulations are examined: the listing of the Northern Spotted Owl (NSO) under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) in 1990, and the implementation of the Northwest Forest Plan (NWFP) in 1994. Support for the public interest theory of regulation relies on the assumption that (A) demand for environmental protection is driven by local populations directly impacted by regulation, (B) declining timber production is driven by technological factors unrelated to environmental policy, and (C) prevention of logging under timber regulations is effective at supporting ecological diversity and endangered populations. I argue there is little evidence to support any of these propositions. In contrast, evidence suggests that various interest groups benefitted significantly from the reduction in federal timber output resulting from environmental regulation, including owners of private timberlands—particularly institutional investors such as timberland investment management organizations (TIMOs) and timberland real-estate investment trusts (REITs)—and Southern timber producers, suggesting a “bootleggers and Baptists” explanation that fits within the public choice framework. Finally, I argue that even if one accepts the public interest rationale for timber regulation, regulation of the timber industry suffers from both knowledge and incentive problems that make it unlikely to succeed.

本文评估了公共利益或公共选择理由在多大程度上解释了太平洋西北地区的木材工业监管。审查了两项关键法规：1990 年根据《濒危物种法》(ESA) 将北方斑点猫头鹰 (NSO) 列入名单，以及 1994 年西北森林计划 (NWFP) 的实施。对监管公共利益理论的支持依赖于假设 (A) 环境保护需求是由直接受监管影响的当地人口驱动的，(B) 木材产量下降是由与环境政策无关的技术因素驱动的，(C) 根据木材法规防止采伐是有效的支持生态多样性和濒危人群。我认为几乎没有证据支持这些主张。相比之下，有证据表明，各种利益集团从环境监管导致的联邦木材产量减少中获益匪浅，其中包括私人林地所有者，尤其是林地投资管理组织（TIMO）和林地房地产投资信托基金（REITs）等机构投资者。 ）——以及南方木材生产商，提出了符合公共选择框架的“走私者和浸信会”解释。最后，我认为，即使人们接受木材监管的公共利益理由，木材行业的监管也面临知识和激励问题，使其不太可能成功。