In this article, we endeavour to lay the theoretical fundaments of a phenomenologically based project regarding the origins of conscious experience in the natural world. We assume that a phenomenological analysis (based upon Edmund Husserl’s philosophy) of first-person experience could substantially contribute to related empirical research. In this regard, two phenomenological conceptions provided by Husserl are of fundamental importance. The first relates to the essential and necessary embodiment of every subjective experience; the second concerns the intrinsically holistic and concrete character of consciousness. These considerations have two crucial implications. First, every mental content and capability ultimately refers to a bodily basis as its carrier and realizer (‘embodied manifestation thesis’). Second, there is a minimal set of bodily structures that carries and realizes the minimal mind (‘minimal context thesis’). Based upon these assumptions, we can use phenomenology to select from the empirical theories of consciousness. We argue that currently, Bjorn Merker’s subcortical theory of consciousness appears to be the best candidate for a phenomenological approach. In phenomenological regard, however, it is highly challenging to test a subcortical theory; therefore, we suggest that certain experiments based upon emergence from general anaesthesia might help test such a theory in a phenomenologically legitimate way.

在本文中，我们致力于为有关自然世界意识体验起源的现象学项目奠定理论基础。我们假设对第一人称体验的现象学分析（基于埃德蒙德·胡塞尔的哲学）可以对相关的实证研究做出重大贡献。在这方面，胡塞尔提供的两个现象学概念具有根本性的重要性。第一个涉及到每一种主观体验的本质和必要的体现；第二个涉及意识的内在整体性和具体性。这些考虑有两个重要的含义。首先，每一种心理内容和能力最终都涉及到作为其载体和实现者的身体基础（“具身表现命题”）。其次，有一组最小的身体结构承载并实现了最小的思想（“最小背景论点”）。基于这些假设，我们可以用现象学来选择意识的经验理论。我们认为，目前，比约恩·默克的皮质下意识理论似乎是现象学方法的最佳候选者。然而，从现象学角度来看，检验皮层下理论极具挑战性。因此，我们建议基于全身麻醉苏醒的某些实验可能有助于以现象学上合法的方式检验这一理论。