The safe operation and management of chemical enterprises remains a critical area of focus, and encouraging companies to proactively invest in emergency management is a significant practical challenge for government supervision. In this study, we combine prospect theory, mental accounting, and evolutionary game theory to establish a bounded-rationality hypothetical model for all actors (enterprises, government, and neighboring residents) involved in the emergency management investments of chemical enterprises. We analyze the evolutionary stable strategies for government departments, neighboring residents, and enterprises under static and three dynamic reward and punishment mechanisms, followed by a simulation analysis. Our findings indicate that: (1) the emergency management investment decisions of chemical enterprises are influenced by multiple factors, not only shaped by external elements but also governed by the decision-makers' own competency factors; (2) the application of a static reward and punishment mechanism by government departments, in the absence of evolutionary stable strategies, fails to exert a substantial restraining effect on enterprises; (3) the adoption of a dynamic reward and punishment mechanism effectively compensates for the limitations of static mechanisms, with the dynamic reward and dynamic punishment mechanism proving to be the optimal choice, outperforming other alternatives.

化工企业的安全运营管理仍是重点关注领域，鼓励企业主动投入应急管理，是政府监管的重大现实挑战。在本研究中，我们结合前景理论、心理账户和演化博弈论，为参与化工企业应急管理投资的所有参与者（企业、政府和邻近居民）建立了有限理性假设模型。我们分析了静态和三种动态奖惩机制下政府部门、周边居民和企业的演化稳定策略，并进行了模拟分析。我们的研究结果表明：（1）化工企业应急管理投资决策受到多种因素的影响，不仅受外部因素影响，还受到决策者自身能力因素的影响； （二）政府部门运用静态奖惩机制，在缺乏演化稳定策略的情况下，未能对企业产生实质约束作用； (3)动态奖惩机制的采用有效弥补了静态机制的局限性，动态奖惩机制被证明是最优选择，优于其他方案。