We develop a model in which a firm's manager can voluntarily disclose to privately informed investors. In equilibrium, the manager only discloses sufficiently favorable news. If the manager is known to be informed but disclosure is costly, the probability of disclosure increases with market liquidity and the stock trades at a discount relative to expected cash flows. However, when investors are uncertain about whether the manager is informed, disclosure can decrease with market liquidity and the stock can trade at a premium relative to expected cash flows. Moreover, contrary to common intuition, public information can crowd in more voluntary disclosure.

中文翻译：

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向知情交易者披露

我们开发了一个模型，公司经理可以自愿向私人知情投资者披露信息。在均衡状态下，管理者只披露足够有利的消息。如果已知经理已知情，但披露的成本很高，则披露的可能性会随着市场流动性的增加而增加，并且股票的交易价格相对于预期现金流量会有折扣。然而，当投资者不确定经理是否知情时，披露可能会随着市场流动性的增加而减少，并且股票的交易价格可能会高于预期现金流。此外，与普遍直觉相反，公共信息可以吸引更多的自愿披露。