We study whether regulators should reveal stress test results that contain imperfect information about banks' financial health. Although disclosure restores market confidence in banks, it misclassifies some healthy banks as risky. This encourages banks to choose portfolios deemed safe by regulators, leading to model monoculture and making the financial system less diversified. Under the ex-ante optimal disclosure policy, the regulator addresses this tradeoff by fully revealing stress test results when adverse selection is very severe or very mild, but never disclosing the results otherwise.

中文翻译：

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压力测试和单一文化模型

我们研究监管机构是否应该披露包含有关银行财务健康状况的不完美信息的压力测试结果。尽管信息披露恢复了市场对银行的信心，但它却将一些健康的银行错误地归类为风险银行。这鼓励银行选择监管机构认为安全的投资组合，导致模式单一化并降低金融体系的多元化程度。在事前最优披露政策下，监管机构通过在逆向选择非常严重或非常温和时充分披露压力测试结果来解决这种权衡，但在其他情况下从不披露结果。