The popularity of live-streaming (LS) has enforced a great number of e-retailers to introduce such an emerging e-commerce mode. Considering the potential benefits brought by LS e-commerce and the various modes for introducing such a strategy, this study examines three possible modes of LS in a competitive context, namely without LS, third-party LS, and self-run LS. By using a stylized game-theoretical model, we explore the impacts of such a selling strategy on both online and offline retailers’ decisions and profits. Our findings show that when the consumer’s hassle cost for LS shopping is low, the LS selling always results in a price-increase effect on the online retailer, while only the third-party LS would have the same effect on the offline retailer. Moreover, the offline retailer always obtains the highest demand with third-party LS, but the online retailer obtains the lowest one. Most importantly, when the online retailer introduces third-party LS, it might result in a “win–win” situation for both retailers. In addition, we extend the basic model to the case with a more powerful online retailer.

直播（LS）的流行，迫使大量电子零售商引入这种新兴的电子商务模式。考虑到LS电商带来的潜在收益以及引入该策略的各种模式，本研究探讨了竞争环境下LS的三种可能模式，即无LS、第三方LS和自营LS。通过使用程式化的博弈论模型，我们探讨了这种销售策略对线上和线下零售商决策和利润的影响。我们的研究结果表明，当消费者LS购物的麻烦成本较低时，LS销售总是会对在线零售商产生涨价效应，而只有第三方LS才会对线下零售商产生同样的涨价效应。而且，线下零售商总是获得第三方LS的最高需求，但在线零售商获得最低的需求。最重要的是，当在线零售商引入第三方LS时，可能会为两家零售商带来“双赢”的局面。此外，我们将基本模型扩展到具有更强大在线零售商的案例。