We develop a theory in which financial (and other professional services) firms design career structures to “sell” prestigious jobs to qualified candidates. Firms create less prestigious entry-level jobs, which serve as currency for employees to pay for the right to compete for the more prestigious jobs. In optimal career structures, entry-level employees (“associates”) compete for better-paid and more prestigious positions (“managing directors” or “partners”). The model provides new implications relating job prestige to compensation, employment, competition, and the size of the financial sector.

中文翻译：

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声望、晋升和薪酬

我们开发了一种理论，其中金融（和其他专业服务）公司设计职业结构以将有声望的工作“出售”给合格的候选人。公司创造不太有声望的入门级工作，这些工作成为员工支付竞争更有声望工作的权利的货币。在最佳的职业结构中，初级员工（“同事”）会争夺薪水更高、更有声望的职位（“董事总经理”或“合伙人”）。该模型提供了将工作声望与薪酬、就业、竞争和金融部门规模联系起来的新含义。