Leaders are a part of virtually every group and organization, and while they help solve the various collective action problems that groups face, they can also be unprincipled and incompetent, pursuing their own interests over those of the group. What types of circumstances foster prosocial leadership and motivate leaders to pursue group interests? In a modified dictator game (N = 798), we examine the effects of piece-rate subsidies (or pay per unit of work performed) and the relative price of giving (or the size of the benefit to others for giving) on prosocial behaviour and norms about giving. We find that subsidies increase giving by leaders, that the relative price of giving is unrelated to prosocial behaviour, and that neither affects norms about giving. Furthermore, the introduction and removal of a subsidy do not undermine giving over time. Our results imply that subsidies increase group welfare by motivating leaders to allocate a larger share of resources to group members.

中文翻译：

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亲社会领导力之路：关于外部补贴影响和给予相对价格的在线实验

领导者几乎是每个团体和组织的一部分，虽然他们帮助解决团体面临的各种集体行动问题，但他们也可能是无原则和无能的，只追求自己的利益而不是团体的利益。哪些类型的环境可以培养亲社会领导力并激励领导者追求群体利益？在修改后的独裁者博弈中（N = 798），我们研究了计件补贴（或每单位工作的报酬）和给予的相对价格（或给予他人的利益大小）对亲社会行为的影响以及关于给予的规范。我们发现补贴增加了领导人的捐赠，捐赠的相对价格与亲社会行为无关，并且都不影响捐赠规范。此外，补贴的引入和取消不会随着时间的推移而削弱捐赠。我们的结果表明，补贴通过激励领导者向群体成员分配更多资源来增加群体福利。