We examine the political budget cycle hypothesis using revenue data from Italian municipal administrations. By leveraging on the staggered schedule of local elections and employing a difference-in-differences strategy, we find evidence of opportunistic behavior by mayors. In pre-election years, mayors reduce total accrued revenues from municipal solid waste fees and property taxes, which are the primary sources of revenue in municipal financial statements. Non-term-limited mayors who seek re-election engage in such opportunistic behavior, while those facing a binding term limit do not manipulate revenues for electoral purposes. Our findings remain robust across various specifications and controls. Heterogeneity analysis suggests that the observed results are primarily driven by smaller municipalities, as well as by those situated in the South of Italy that exhibit low levels of social capital. Mayors employing political budget cycles also strategically offset reductions in highly salient fees and taxes by raising less salient non-tax revenues. This study contributes to the understanding of political budget cycles in the context of Italian municipal administrations and has implications for the broader literature on electoral behavior and public finance.

我们使用意大利市政当局的收入数据检验政治预算周期假设。通过利用地方选举的错开时间表并采用双重差异策略，我们发现了市长们机会主义行为的证据。在选举前几年，市长们会减少城市固体废物费和财产税的应计收入总额，而这些是城市财务报表中的主要收入来源。寻求连任的无任期限制的市长会从事这种机会主义行为，而那些面临有约束力的任期限制的市长不会为了选举目的而操纵收入。我们的研究结果在各种规范和控制下仍然稳健。异质性分析表明，观察到的结果主要是由较小的城市以及位于意大利南部社会资本水平较低的城市驱动的。市长们利用政治预算周期还可以通过提高不太显着的非税收入来战略性地抵消显着费用和税收的减少。这项研究有助于理解意大利市政当局背景下的政治预算周期，并对更广泛的选举行为和公共财政文献产生影响。