This study investigates the impact of macroeconomic shocks to firm investment opportunities on firm debt contracting policy. We find that adverse shocks to investment opportunities lead to a significant reduction in the use of debt covenants in syndicated bank loans. Consistent with incomplete contract theory, we show that firms mitigate debt–equity conflicts arising out of investment opportunities by employing accounting-based financial covenants rather than non-accounting-based prepayment covenants. Adverse shocks to investment opportunities also lead to a concomitant decrease in the cost of borrowing. We find consistent evidence for corporate bond covenants and bond market borrowing costs as well. Overall, this study resolves prior mixed evidence concerning the impact of investment opportunities on debt contracting and connects macroeconomic theory with the accounting literature on debt contracting.

中文翻译：

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投资机会和债务收缩的代理成本：来自政府支出的外生冲击的证据


本研究调查了宏观经济冲击对企业投资机会对企业债务收缩政策的影响。我们发现，投资机会受到的不利冲击导致银团贷款中债务契约的使用大幅减少。与不完全契约理论一致，我们表明，企业通过采用基于会计的财务契约而不是基于非会计的预付款契约来缓解投资机会引起的债权冲突。对投资机会的不利冲击也会导致借贷成本随之下降。我们还发现了公司债券契约和债券市场借贷成本的一致证据。总体而言，本研究解决了先前有关投资机会对债务契约影响的混合证据，并将宏观经济理论与债务契约会计文献联系起来。