Moritz Geiger’s 1911 article on the consciousness of feeling, entitled “Das Bewusstsein von Gefühlen,” was an object of study for Husserl in a series of manuscripts recently published in Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins II. Gefühl und Wert (1896-1925)(2020). Geiger’s article and Husserl’s remarks on it received attention from Métraux (1975), but, more recently, an increasing number of publications have been devoted to the topic (Averchi, 2015a, 2015b; Crespo, 2015; Quepons, 2017; Marcos del Cano, 2023). These new publications identify a central area of disagreement between the two authors concerning the nature of emotive consciousness, i.e., the mode in which affective states relate to their objects. For Geiger, emotions are directed toward their objects but are not regarded as intentional and, in certain forms of consciousness, can even lose their relation to their objects. By contrast, for Husserl, intentionality is an intrinsic feature of emotive consciousness. The paper shows that Geiger’s and Husserl’s disagreement on the nature of emotions is rooted in their different pictures of the structure of consciousness and, in particular, the place of feeling in their respective ontologies of the mind.

莫里茨·盖革 (Moritz Geiger) 1911 年关于感觉意识的文章，题为“Das Bewusstsein von Gefühlen”，是胡塞尔最近在 Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins II 上发表的一系列手稿中的研究对象。《Gefühl und Wert》（1896-1925）（2020）。盖革的文章和胡塞尔对此的评论引起了 Métraux (1975) 的关注，但最近，越来越多的出版物致力于该主题 (Averchi, 2015a, 2015b; Crespo, 2015; Quepons, 2017; Marcos del Cano, 2023）。这些新出版物指出了两位作者在情感意识的本质（即情感状态与其对象相关的模式）方面存在分歧的中心领域。对于盖革来说，情感是针对其对象的，但不被视为有意的，并且在某些形式的意识中，甚至可能失去与对象的关系。相比之下，对于胡塞尔来说，意向性是情感意识的内在特征。该论文表明，盖革和胡塞尔对情感本质的分歧根源于他们对意识结构的不同看法，特别是情感在各自心灵本体论中的地位。