Purpose

This study investigates whether a firm that has experienced an environmental accident (EA) is less likely to conduct a product recall. If true, it would indicate that EAs tempt firms to hide operational problems that need to be revealed. The logic is that both events are operational failures that damage a firm's reputation and share price. Following an EA, a firm may avoid a discretionary product recall to avoid providing additional evidence of operational incapability and social irresponsibility and thereby triggering amplified reputational and market penalties.

Design/methodology/approach

The dataset is compiled from several public and private sources and includes 4,355 product recalls, 153 EAs and 120 firms from the industries that often recall products, including automotive, pharma, medical device, food and consumer products. The study timeframe is 2002–2013. Empirical models are evaluated using hazard modeling.

Findings

Results show that EAs reduce the probability of a product recall by 32%, on average. Effect sizes are larger when accidents are more frequent or more severe and when recalls are less severe. Through post hoc analyses, the study finds support for the proposed mechanism that firms avoid recalls due to reputational concerns, provides evidence that EAs can have a lengthy impact on recall behavior, and shows that firms are more likely to avoid recalls managed by the CPSC and NHTSA than recalls managed by the FDA.

Originality/value

Prior studies in operations management (OM) have not examined the impact of one negative event on another. This study finds that EAs tempt firms to hide operational problems that need to be revealed. While recalling fewer defective products is of concern to consumers and regulators, should EAs influence a broader set of discretionary operational decisions, such as closing/relocating a production facility, outsourcing production or conducting a layoff, study implications increase significantly.

中文翻译：

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隐藏需要揭露的运营问题——一项将环境事故与产品召回联系起来的研究

目的

本研究调查了经历过环境事故 (EA) 的公司是否不太可能进行产品召回。如果属实，则表明环境评估会诱使公司隐藏需要披露的运营问题。其逻辑是，这两起事件都是运营失败，损害了公司的声誉和股价。EA 实施后，公司可以避免酌情召回产品，以避免提供运营无能力和社会不负责任的额外证据，从而引发更大的声誉和市场处罚。

设计/方法论/途径

该数据集由多个公共和私人来源编制而成，包括 4,355 个产品召回、153 个 EA 和来自经常召回产品的行业（包括汽车、制药、医疗器械、食品和消费品）的 120 家公司。研究时间范围为2002年至2013年。使用危险模型评估经验模型。

发现

结果表明，EA 平均将产品召回的可能性降低了 32%。当事故更加频繁或更严重以及召回不那么严重时，效应大小就更大。通过事后分析，该研究发现了对拟议机制的支持，即企业出于声誉考虑而避免召回，提供了证据表明 EA 可以对召回行为产生长期影响，并表明企业更有可能避免由 CPSC 管理的召回，并且NHTSA 的召回由 FDA 管理。

原创性/价值

先前的运营管理（OM）研究并未考察一个负面事件对另一个负面事件的影响。这项研究发现，环境评估会诱使企业隐藏需要披露的运营问题。虽然召回较少的缺陷产品是消费者和监管机构关注的问题，但如果 EA 影响更广泛的酌情运营决策，例如关闭/搬迁生产设施、外包生产或进行裁员，研究意义将显着增加。