We introduce career concerns into rank-order tournaments and offer a novel explanation for the pervasiveness of multiple prizes. We argue that career-concerned individuals, already facing market pressure to perform, will be reluctant to participate in winner-take-all competitions. To entice them and maximize performance, the organizer promises a softer competition through multiple prizes. We show that the minimum number of prizes is single-peaked in the population's talent variance and increasing in publicly disclosed ranks. We also examine entry fees, talent pre-screening, and prize budget as design tools for tournaments, along with prize allocation.

我们将职业关注引入排名顺序锦标赛中，并对多种奖项的普遍存在提供了新颖的解释。我们认为，那些关心职业的个人，已经面临着市场的表现压力，将不愿意参加赢者通吃的竞争。为了吸引他们并最大限度地提高他们的表现，主办方承诺通过多种奖项进行更温和的竞争。我们表明，最低奖项数量在总体人才差异中是单峰的，并且在公开披露的排名中呈增加趋势。我们还检查参赛费、人才预筛选和奖金预算，作为锦标赛的设计工具以及奖金分配。