The reasoning behind lie detection based on imposing cognitive load is as follows. In interview settings lying is typically more mentally taxing than truth telling (Gombos, 2006; Walczyk et al., 2013). Theoretically, interviewers could exploit this difference by imposing cognitive load. This should affect lie tellers more than truth tellers because lie tellers will have fewer cognitive resources left over than truth tellers. Asking interviewees to recall their stories in reverse order is one way of imposing cognitive load. Although we (Vrij et al., 2012) and others (Evans et al., 2013) found support for the reverse order lie detection technique, Brimbal et al. (2023) found no support. After failing to replicate our findings, Brimbal et al. (2023) conclude that there may not be sufficient evidence to train the reverse order technique in the field. We came to this conclusion in Vrij and Fisher (2016)—an article cited by Brimbal et al. (2023)—amongst other reasons because the accuracy rates obtained by imposing cognitive load lie detection techniques are quite low. Two meta-analyses supported this conclusion: 58% accuracy rate for truth tellers and 63% for lie tellers in Vrij et al. (2017) and 58.39% (total accuracy rate) in Mac Giolla and Luke (2021). In other words, we are in full agreement with Brimbal et al. (2023) about the usefulness of using reverse order recall as an imposing cognitive load lie detection technique.

We still believe in the principle of imposing cognitive load lie detection but have difficulty translating it into a valuable lie detection technique. Apart from reverse order recall, we examined other ways to impose cognitive load, such as instructing interviewees to maintain eye contact with the interviewer (Vrij et al., 2010) or to remember a car registration number plate during the recall (Vrij, Deeb, et al., 2022). We do not recommend introducing such techniques either. The observable differences were not particularly strong and, although we can give interviewees such imposing cognitive load instructions in the lab, we do not consider it feasible in real life. The closest we came to a successful implementation of imposing cognitive load is in a collective interviewing scenario (interviewing pairs of interviewees together) where we used the forced turn-taking technique (Vernham et al., 2014). In forced turn-taking, the interviewer asks one interviewee to starts answering a question. After a short period of time the interviewer will then interrupt the interviewee and will ask the second interviewee to continue with the story. After again a short period of time that person is interrupted, and the first interviewee is asked to continue. Compared to lie telling pairs, truth telling pairs had more fluent continuations in their accounts, whereas lying pairs were more likely to repeat what their partner last said before continuing. Lie telling pairs also waited longer than truth telling pairs with speaking after a turn-take request. A lie detection test revealed an 76.7% accuracy rate when observers were asked to pay attention to these three cues (continuations, repetitions, waiting).

Brimbal et al. (2023) replicated our finding that truth tellers sounded more plausible than lie tellers. We think this is worth mentioning because we are increasingly interested in plausibility. It typically emerges as a strong (and often the strongest) veracity indicator in our research, see Vrij, Deeb, et al. (2021) for a review, but also Vrij, Leal, et al. (2022) and Chandler et al. (2023). Other researchers also found plausibility to be the strongest veracity indicator (Sporer et al., 2021). Plausibility is often used as a veracity cue by laypersons (Hartwig & Bond, 2011) and by practitioners (Vrij et al., 2023), including in asylum interviews (UNHCR, 2013). Several verbal deception researchers, however, do not examine plausibility, although their deception scenarios are well suited for plausibility measurements. We encourage them to start examining plausibility. We think that the verbal lie detection domain cannot ignore examining a cue that works well as a veracity cue in research and is frequently used in the field.

We found some positive effects of reverse order lie detection recall, but Brimbal et al. (2023) did not. Comparing experiments is problematic and explaining the differences between Vrij et al. (2012) and Brimbal et al. (2023) is speculative. First, the effects Vrij et al. (2012) found were rather weak so there was always a fair chance that it would fail the replication test. In addition, truth tellers and lie tellers in Vrij et al. (2012) were considerably more motivated than those in Brimbal et al. (2023). According to Brimbal et al. (2023, p. ????) motivation is unlikely to have impacted their results, citing Hartwig and Bond (2011). We disagree. Hartwig and Bond (2011) did not measure whether motivation affects interviewees' responses in strategic interview protocols. We can easily reason why it would. Truth tellers employ a ‘tell it all’ strategy in interviews (Granhag & Hartwig, 2008). This requires considerable effort, even more so in reverse order recall because that is mentally taxing. Truth tellers will put less effort in reporting information if they are less motivated. The less they say, the more they will sound like lie tellers.

Brimbal et al.'s (2023) lie detection test took place online via MTurk whereas ours took place in-class. MTurk lie detection studies are easy to run and inexpensive, but we find them remote from a real life lie detection experience. Our experience with running in-class lie detection experiments is that observers quickly lose attention. Did the observers in Brimbal et al. (2023) pay attention to the stimulus materials? No check was introduced but attention checks are nowadays recommended (Hauser & Schwartz, 2016). The MTurk participants may not have paid much attention because they could make veracity judgements regardless. Of course, attention checks should also be introduced during in-class lie detection tests.

Our thinking about lie detection has developed since Vrij et al. (2012). Imposing cognitive load is no longer prominent. The rationale of cognitive credibility assessment (CCA) is that the strategies used by truth tellers (tell it all) and lie tellers (keep it simple) are different (Strömwall & Willén, 2011) and that these differences can be exploited. Truth tellers do not spontaneously report all information (Vrij et al., 2014) because (i) they do not know how much they are required to say, (ii) are not motivated to tell it all or (iii) find it difficult to retrieve information from memory. CCA uses techniques to facilitate these three aspects and that includes reverse order recall, a memory-enhancement tool (Vrij, Granhag, et al., 2022; Vrij, Mann, et al., 2021). These techniques should have a larger effect on truth tellers than on lie tellers because lie tellers prefer to keep their stories simple to (i) avoid reporting incriminating evidence, (ii) remain consistent if interviewed multiple times and (iii) make story telling easier.

Others also include reverse order recall in their protocols (Bogaard et al., 2019; Colwell et al., 2009). The reverse order recall is part of the cognitive interview (Fisher & Geiselman, 2019), an interview tool that facilitates memory recall in cooperative witnesses (truth tellers) (Memon et al., 2010). Similar to the cognitive interview, in CCA, after some recall attempts, interviewees are invited to report the event again but this time in reverse order. The reverse order recall instruction invites truth tellers to think about the event again from a different perspective, which often leads to new information. A reverse order recall is less likely to lead to new information in lie tellers due to their inclination to keep their stories simple. In other words, nowadays we—and others (Bogaard et al., 2019; Colwell et al., 2009)—use reverse order recall as a memory-enhancement tool in a cluster of ‘encouraging interviewees to say more’ techniques (Vrij, Mann, et al., 2021). We predicted and found that truth tellers report more additional information after a reverse order recall instruction than lie tellers (Ewens et al., 2016; Shaw et al., 2014; Vrij, Mann, et al., 2021).

We started our cognitive lie detection research with imposing cognitive load manipulations (e.g. Vrij et al., 2008) but moved on from that. We asked researchers to explore cognitive lie detection (Vrij et al., 2008) and many researchers took this up. Brimbal et al. (2023) propose more replication studies. Others prefer to carry out innovative research by designing new techniques, such as the strategic use of evidence (Granhag & Hartwig, 2015; Oleszkiewicz & Watson, 2021) and the verifiability approach (Nahari, 2019).

基于施加认知负荷的谎言检测背后的推理如下。在访谈环境中，撒谎通常比说真话更费脑力（Gombos，  2006；Walczyk 等，  2013）。理论上，面试官可以通过施加认知负荷来利用这种差异。这对说谎者的影响应该比说真话的人更大，因为说谎者留下的认知资源比说真话的人少。要求受访者以相反的顺序回忆他们的故事是施加认知负荷的一种方式。尽管我们（Vrij 等人，  2012）和其他人（Evans 等人，  2013）找到了对逆序测谎技术的支持，但 Brimbal 等人。（2023）没有找到支持。在未能复制我们的发现后，Brimbal 等人。（2023）得出的结论是，可能没有足够的证据来在现场训练逆序技术。我们在 Vrij 和 Fisher ( 2016 )中得出了这一结论——Brimbal 等人引用的一篇文章。（2023）——除其他原因外，通过施加认知负荷测谎技术获得的准确率相当低。两项荟萃分析支持了这一结论：Vrij 等人的说真话的准确率是 58%，说谎的准确率为 63%。( 2017 ) 和 Mac Giolla 和 Luke ( 2021 )中的 58.39%（总准确率）。换句话说，我们完全同意 Brimbal 等人的观点。（2023）关于使用逆序回忆作为一种强加认知负荷的谎言检测技术的有用性。

我们仍然相信施加认知负荷测谎的原则，但很难将其转化为有价值的测谎技术。除了逆序回忆之外，我们还研究了其他施加认知负荷的方法，例如指导受访者与采访者保持目光接触（Vrij et al.,  2010）或在回忆过程中记住汽车车牌号（Vrij, Deeb,等人，  2022）。我们也不建议引入此类技术。可观察到的差异并不是特别明显，尽管我们可以在实验室中向受访者提供如此强悍的认知负荷指示，但我们认为这在现实生活中并不可行。我们最接近成功实施施加认知负荷的情况是在集体访谈场景（一起访谈成对的受访者）中，我们使用了强制轮流技术（Vernham 等，  2014）。在强制轮流中，采访者要求一名受访者开始回答问题。一小段时间后，采访者会打断受访者并要求第二位受访者继续讲故事。过了一小段时间，那个人又被打断了，第一个受访者被要求继续。与说谎的情侣相比，说真话的情侣在他们的叙述中可以更流畅地继续，而说谎的情侣更有可能在继续之前重复他们的伴侣最后说的话。在轮流请求后，说谎的两人比说真话的两人等待的时间更长。测谎测试显示，当观察者被要求注意这三个线索（继续、重复、等待）时，准确率达到 76.7%。

布林巴尔等人。（2023）重复了我们的发现，即说真话的人听起来比说谎的人更可信。我们认为这一点值得一提，因为我们对合理性越来越感兴趣。在我们的研究中，它通常作为一个强有力的（通常是最强的）真实性指标出现，参见 Vrij、Deeb 等人。( 2021 ) 进行审查，还有 Vrij、Leal 等人。（2022）和钱德勒等人。（2023）。其他研究人员还发现合理性是最强的准确性指标（Sporer 等人，  2021）。外行人士（Hartwig & Bond， 2011）和从业者（Vrij 等人，  2023 ）经常将合理性用作真实性提示 ，包括在庇护面谈中（UNHCR，  2013）。然而，一些言语欺骗研究人员并没有检查合理性，尽管他们的欺骗场景非常适合合理性测量。我们鼓励他们开始检查合理性。我们认为，言语测谎领域不能忽视对在研究中作为真实性提示有效且在该领域经常使用的提示的检查。

我们发现逆序测谎召回有一些积极作用，但 Brimbal 等人。（2023）没有。比较实验并解释 Vrij 等人之间的差异是有问题的。（2012）和 Brimbal 等人。（2023）是推测性的。首先，Vrij 等人的影响。（2012）发现相当弱，因此总是有很大的机会无法通过复制测试。此外，Vrij 等人中的说真话者和说谎者。（2012）比 Brimbal 等人的积极性要高得多。（2023）。根据 Brimbal 等人的说法。( 2023 , p. ????) 动机不太可能影响他们的结果，引用 Hartwig 和 Bond ( 2011 ) 的话。我们不同意。Hartwig 和 Bond（2011）没有衡量动机是否影响受访者在战略访谈协议中的反应。我们可以很容易地推断出为什么会这样。说真话的人在采访中采用“告诉一切”策略（Granhag & Hartwig，  2008）。这需要相当大的努力，尤其是逆序回忆，因为这很费脑力。如果讲真话的积极性较低，他们在报告信息上就会付出更少的努力。他们说得越少，听起来就越像说谎者。

Brimbal 等人 ( 2023 ) 的测谎测试是通过 MTurk 在线进行的，而我们的测试是在课堂上进行的。MTurk 测谎研究易于运行且成本低廉，但我们发现它们与现实生活中的测谎体验相去甚远。我们在课堂上进行测谎实验的经验是，观察者很快就会失去注意力。Brimbal 等人的观察者是否？( 2023 )关注刺激材料？没有引入检查，但现在建议进行注意检查（Hauser & Schwartz，  2016）。MTurk 参与者可能没有太关注，因为他们无论如何都可以做出真实性判断。当然，在课堂测谎测试中也应该引入注意力检查。

自 Vrij 等人以来，我们对测谎的思考已经发展起来。（2012）。施加认知负荷不再是突出问题。认知可信度评估（CCA）的基本原理是说真话的人（说出全部）和说谎的人（保持简单）使用的策略是不同的（Strömwall & Willén，  2011）并且这些差异可以被利用。说真话的人不会自发地报告所有信息（Vrij et al.,  2014），因为 (i) 他们不知道自己需要说多少，(ii) 没有动力说出全部信息，或者 (iii) 发现很难说出全部信息。从记忆中检索信息。CCA 使用技术来促进这三个方面，其中包括逆序回忆，这是一种记忆增强工具（Vrij, Granhag, et al.,  2022；Vrij, Mann, et al.,  2021）。这些技巧对说真话的人的影响应该比对说谎者的影响更大，因为说谎者更喜欢让他们的故事保持简单，以便（i）避免报告有罪的证据，（ii）在多次采访时保持一致，以及（iii）使故事讲述更容易。

其他人还在他们的协议中包括逆序召回（Bogaard 等人，  2019；Colwell 等人，  2009）。逆序回忆是认知访谈的一部分（Fisher & Geiselman，  2019），这是一种促进合作证人（说真话者）记忆回忆的访谈工具（Memon et al.,  2010）。与认知访谈类似，在 CCA 中，经过一些回忆尝试后，受访者被邀请再次报告该事件，但这次以相反的顺序。逆序回忆指令会邀请说真话的人从不同的角度再次思考事件，这通常会带来新的信息。逆序回忆不太可能给说谎者带来新信息，因为他们倾向于保持故事简单。换句话说，现在我们和其他人（Bogaard 等人，  2019 年；Colwell 等人，  2009 年）在一系列“鼓励受访者多说”技术中使用逆序回忆作为记忆增强工具（Vrij，曼恩等人，  2021）。我们预测并发现，说真话的人在逆序回忆指令后比说谎的人报告更多的附加信息（Ewens et al.,  2016；Shaw et al.,  2014；Vrij, Mann, et al.,  2021）。

我们通过施加认知负荷操作开始了认知测谎研究（例如 Vrij 等人，  2008），但随后又继续前进。我们要求研究人员探索认知测谎（Vrij et al.,  2008），许多研究人员接受了这一点。布林巴尔等人。（2023）提出更多的复制研究。其他人更喜欢通过设计新技术来进行创新研究，例如证据的战略使用（Granhag & Hartwig，  2015；Oleszkiewicz & Watson，  2021）和可验证性方法（Nahari，  2019）。